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ABSTRACT
ACQUAINTANCE INFLUENCES MEMORY FOR CONSISTENT
VERSUS INCONSISTENT INTERPERSONAL INFORMATION
SEPTEMBER 1994
SCOTT VAN MANEN, B.A.
, YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Assistant Professor Paula Pietromonaco
Researchers have proposed a relationship between schema
strength and memory for consistent versus inconsistent
information. This phenomenon may be especially influential
in interpersonal relationships, where friends may have
strong and well developed schemas, whereas strangers may
have weak and newly formed schemas. In the three studies,
friends or strangers initially guessed their partner's
response to a series of multiple choice questions and then
viewed feedback they believed to be their partners' actual
response. Feedback varied in whether it was consistent,
mildly inconsistent, or very inconsistent with the guess.
Results confirmed that subjects who had just met showed a
memory bias in favor of schema inconsistent information. In
contrast, subjects in pre-existent friend pairs showed a
memory bias in favor of schema-consistent information. We
found no evidence that the effect was mediated by
elaboration, dispositional attributions, or certainty. The
role of relationship quality remains unclear.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A puzzle lurks in our intuitions about memory. On one
hand, we may best remember when someone acts as we expect
them to. As the proverb "love is blind" suggests, we may
deny or block memories of actions that seem inconsistent
with our impressions of our loved ones, and instead remember
the actions that are consistent with our impressions of
them. Further, this memory bias may not be limited to
positive relationships. Because open-mindedness and hatred
seem incompatible, hate may be as blind as love.
Yet on the other hand, the opposite also seems likely;
that inconsistent actions stand out in our memories. For
example, a single misbehavior by the "good daughter" may
stand out in the memories of the family long after the
transgressions by her ill-behaved sister have been
forgotten.
Research on memory bias in interpersonal contexts has
paradoxically tended to focus on non-intimate relationships,
often eliciting subjects' impressions of fictitious "paper"
targets and then testing the effect on memory. Research on
memory in real relationships has received relatively little
attention. This seems odd, given that we presumably spend
most of our time with, and are most strongly influenced by,
people we have known longer than the duration of the usual
person memory experiment. Thus, we sensed a gap in our
understanding of the relationship between person schemas and
1
person memory. The present work examines how close
relationships influence how we think - and what we
remember - about each other.
Memory for Consistent anH
InconsistP-nt Informatinn
Memory for consistent and inconsistent information has
been of interest to social psychologists for least 2 0 years
(e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero,
1979; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; Zadny & Gerard, 1974). As
noted elsewhere (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hastie, 1981;
Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Ruble & Stangor, 1986), research in
this area has yielded varied results, with some studies
showing a memory bias favoring impression-consistent
information, and others showing a memory bias favoring
impression-inconsistent information
.
Table 1 shows how several theorists (Hastie, 1981;
Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Ruble & Stangor, 1986) have addressed
these varied results. For example, Hastie (1981) proposed
that these various findings may result from an underlying
non-monotonic U-shaped function of schema congruence on
memory^. In this model, both information that is highly
schema-congruent and highly schema-incongruent are better
^ Hastie 's (1981) use of the term congruence reflects
his view that new information is assessed against a relevant
schema. Consistency, as used in this article, expresses a
more general relationship. Consistency refers to the degree
of matching between the impression (or schema) and new
information, without making assumptions about which is the
standard against which the other is judged. Therefore,
congruence may be considered a type of consistency.
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Table 1. A review of some of the models that address memoryfor impression-consistent and impression-inconsistentinformation.
Model
Description
of model
Cause of
memory bias
Description
of bias
Empirical
Support
Hastle
(1981)
New
information
is assessed
against pre-
existing
schema.
U-Shaped
function of
congruence
on memory.
Very
congruent
and very
incongruent
information
better
remembered
than
irrelevant
information.
Several
studies, e.g.,
Srull,
Lichtenstein, &
Rothbart
(1985).
Ruble &
Stangor
(1986)
As schema
develops, it
becomes
"stronger,
"
may
incorporate
greater
amounts of
information,
and show
greater
certainty.
Interaction
between
schema
strength and
consistency
.
Weak schemas
favor memory
for
inconsistent
information,
strong
schemas
favor memory
of
consistent
information.
Their
literature
review.
Meta-analysis
by Stangor &
McMillan
(1992).
Some
experimental
support from
Stangor & Ruble
(1989b).
Higgins
& Bargh
(1987)
Processing
goal may
depend on
schema
strength.
Interaction
between
processing
goal and
consistency.
Schema
forming
favors
memory for
inconsistent
information,
schema
testing
favors
memory for
consistent
information.
Consistent with
extant
research.
Expert
models
Experts have
very
schemas, and
so are able
to process
and use a
wide variety
of
information.
Novices have
little
\^ \J kX^ U> ^ V ^
capacity,
and
therefore
remember the
"easier"
consistent
information.
Novices
favor memory
of
consistent
information,
experts show
little bias
and greater
overall
memory
.
Fiske, Kinder,
k Larter
(1983)
.
Borgida &
DeBono (1989).
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Les
remembered than the (irrelevant) information that li
between, and whether you find a memory bias favoring
consistent or inconsistent information depends on what parts
of the "U" the information happens to fall, several studies
(e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989; Srull,
Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985) have found support for this
idea.
Ruble and Stangor (1986, see also Fiske & Neuberg,
1990) have proposed that differences in memory bias for
consistent and inconsistent information may be due to
differences in the schema used to process the information.
Based on a review of research on gender constancy, they
present a model of schema development. In this model, newly
formed or weak schemas tend to bias memory in favor of
inconsistent information, whereas stronger, better developed
schemas tend to bias memory in favor of consistent
information. They predict that stronger, better developed
schemas should incorporate more knowledge, and be of greater
importance to the individual than less developed, weaker
schemas
.
Ruble and Stangor 's (1986) model does not specifically
address extreme ends of the development continuum. Thus, it
does not deal with memory bias during the transition from
having no schema to having a new schema. Elsewhere,
however. Ruble and Stangor (1989b) have proposed an inverted
U-shaped function of early schema development on memory for
inconsistent information. They propose that inconsistency
4
goes unnoticed and unremembered when the schema is at its
earliest stage of development, because there is no schema to
influence memory, and then becomes better remembered as the
schema begins to form, in this model, it is in the later
stages of development that inconsistent information again
tends to be "resisted" and forgotten.
In addition. Ruble and Stangor's (1986) schema
development model does not specifically address the
influence of extremely well developed schemas on memory.
Ruble (1994), however, addresses this issue in a separate,
but related model bf transitions, which describes how people
seek information as they approach important life
transitions. Schema development would seem relevant to life
transition, because transitions may require new schemas.
Ruble proposes 3 phases of transition; construction,
consolidation, and integration. Whereas Ruble and Stangor's
(1986) schema development model makes no prediction for
extremely well developed schemas. Ruble's (1994) transition
model proposes a third phase called consolidation, which
seems relevant to the later sages of schema development. In
the consolidation phase, individual differences in amount of
knowledge, conclusions drawn during earlier phases, external
constraints or opportunities, importance of the conclusions,
and importance of relevant schemas influence the person's
tolerance for new inconsistent information^.
^ In addition. Ruble's model of transitions differs
from the schema development model in predictions about
memory for inconsistent information. Specifically, whereas
5
Stangor and Ruble (I989a) controlled schema development
by manipulating the amount of knowledge subjects received
about two fictitious fraternities which contained either
mostly introverts or mostly extroverts. Half of their
subjects viewed an "experience set" of 30 slides containing
information about the fraternities. The other half did not
view the slides. They found no support for the predicted
interaction between the experience manipulation and
information consistency on the amount of information
recalled or recognized. However, some results were
consistent with predictions of schema development.
Specifically, "schema experienced" subjects recalled
information that was rated on average as more extremely
consistent with the target label, and recalled significantly
more consistent than inconsistent information. However,
"schema inexperienced" subjects did not remember
significantly more inconsistent than consistent information.
In another test of schema development, Stangor and
Ruble (1989b) tested the influence of age, gender constancy
(gender schema strength) , and knowledge of gender
stereotypes on memory for gender-consistent and gender-
inconsistent information in 4-year-old, 6-year-old, and 9-
year-old children. Although they found a significant effect
for age, such that older subjects showed a greater recall
a salient feature of the schema development model is
increased memory for inconsistent information at early
stages of development, the transition model makes no
prediction of a memory bias at the early phase of
transition.
6
bias in favor of gender consistent information, they found
no effect for gender constancy or amount of knowledge about
gender stereotypes on recall bias, m addition, amount of
knowledge, gender constancy, and age all failed to show an
effect on recognition bias.
Although no single study provides strong support for
the schema development hypothesis, empirical support comes
from a meta-analysis done by Stangor and McMillan (1992). As
noted above. Ruble and Stangor (1986) have proposed that
more developed schemas should be stronger. Stangor and
McMillan (1992) focus on expectancy strength,
operationalized as whether the schema was preexistent or
experimentally formed, and generally confirm the predictions
of schema development. Specifically, they found that
individuals who held well established expectancies showed a
greater tendency to recall expectancy-congruent information
than did those who held weak (experimentally formed)
expectancies. In contrast, those who held weak expectancies
showed less tendency toward recall of congruent information
than did those who held strong expectancies, and greater
recall of incongruent information. All of the well
established schema concerned either gender or ethnic
schemas. All of the studies using individuals as targets
have used "paper," experimentally formed impressions. To
date we know of no study that experimentally measures memory
biases between real individuals.
7
Higgins and Bargh (1987) have proposed that whether
memory is biased in favor of consistent or inconsistent
information depends on the goal of the individual. They
propose that the divergent results for memory of consistent
and inconsistent information arise because, in some
circumstances, subjects are forming a schema and, in others,
they are testing a schema. Specifically, subjects who have
the goal of forming a schema are likely to show a bias in
favor of schema-inconsistent information. The choice of
goal in turn may be influenced by schema strength. Higgins
and Bargh argue that individuals are forming a schema when
they have a "temporary" expectancy (such as one based on
behavior norms)
,
or when the expectancy manipulation was
"weak." In contrast, subjects with strong expectancies will
tend to have the goal of testing a schema, and should show a
memory bias in favor of consistent information.
Both Ruble and Stangor (1986) and Higgins and Bargh
(1987) propose that schema strength interacts with schema
consistency to affect memory. Although researchers agree
that schema strength and level of schema development
influence memory for consistent and inconsistent
information, they do not seem to agree about what schema
strength actually is. As noted above, Stangor and Ruble
(1989a, 1989b) have failed to support the hypothesis that
level of knowledge plays a role in the effects of schema
development on memory bias. Finally, schema development has
been studied using a fairly limited variety of schemas.
8
specifically schemas of gender, ethnicity, and
experimentally induced schemas. The present work extends
previous work by examining schema development in the context
of a new versus an established relationship.
Expert Schemas
As outlined above, the schema development model
predicts a shift from a bias favoring memory of inconsistent
information to one favoring consistent information as a
schema develops. This prediction can be extended to the
surprising conclusion that people who know the most also are
the most likely to forget impression-inconsistent
information. Therefore, it implies that people who
presumably know a great deal about each other, such as
married couples, are in some sense blind to new and
inconsistent information about their spouse. Similarly, it
implies that those people our society trusts most to make
important decisions, namely experts, are similarly impaired.
Research on social schemas has supported the premise
that people with expert schemas will show superior ability
to process relevant information. A study by Pryor and
Merluzzi (1985) compared male subjects who were experts on
dating (having dated 6 or more people in the previous year)
with males who were novices (having dated fewer than 3
people in the previous year) . They found that experts were
much faster at sorting randomly ordered date events into
coherent dating scripts, suggesting that experts had a more
coherent representation of these scripts than did novices.
9
However, unlike the current set of studies, this study did
not include a measure of memory.
Other research on expert schemas contradicts the
hypothesis that people with well developed schemas will show
a reduced memory for inconsistent information. For example,
relative to novices, experts appear to store information
more efficiently (Chase & Simon, 1973), allowing them
greater cognitive capacity for processing inconsistent
information (Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, 1983; Fiske & Taylor,
1991). In fact, Fiske and Taylor (1991) have proposed a U-
shaped function in which individuals remember more
inconsistent information at initial stages of schema
formation and at high levels of expertise, but they remember
more consistent information at the intermediate phase.
Although this proposed U-shaped function of schema
development on memory may seem to contradict Stangor and
Ruble's (1989b) inverted U-shaped function, this
contradiction may be more apparent than real. Stangor and
Ruble's model addresses the transition from no schema to the
formation of a new schema, whereas Fiske and Taylor's model
begins with an already formed schema and moves to the later
stages of schema development.
Extra cognitive capacity may be a vital element in the
functioning of expert schemas. Bargh and Thein (1985)
provide convergent evidence for the effects of this extra
cognitive capacity in a study comparing subjects who were
chronic on the trait of honesty with those who were not.
10
Chronics resemble experts in that they may require less
cognitive effort to process information relevant to their
domain of chronicity. This efficiency should provide
Chronics with extra cognitive capacity for processing
inconsistent information, even under conditions of greater
cognitive load. Results showed that under conditions of
light cognitive load, chronics and non-chronics both showed
free recall favoring minority (impression inconsistent)
information. As predicted, this bias disappeared in non-
chronics under conditions of greater cognitive load, but
remained in chronics. This suggests that chronics were more
efficient in processing information relevant to their
chronic construct, and that this efficiency allowed them to
be relatively unaffected by the cognitive load.
Further supporting this perspective, Fiske, Kinder, and
Larter (1983) compared recall of consistent versus
inconsistent information in political experts and novices.
Novices recalled more consistent information than
inconsistent information. In contrast, experts recalled
more inconsistent information than consistent information.
This pattern of recall is the opposite of what would be
predicted from a schema development perspective. Similarly,
Borgida and DeBono (1989) found no difference between
experts and novices on the amount of impression-consistent
information recalled. Consistent with predictions of
expertise, however, they found that experts, relative to
novices, recalled more hypothesis disconfirming (and thus
11
impression-inconsistent) information. Again, this pattern
of recall opposes the prediction of schema development that
those people with highly developed impressions should show a
memory bias in favor of impression-consistent information.
Certainty. Impression-Consistency, and Memnry
Ruble (1994) and several other social psychological
theorists (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagley, 1989;
Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991; Trope, 1983) have
hypothesized that certainty, or lack of it, predicts
information seeking. Specifically, Ruble (1994) has
proposed a model of schema development in which lack of
certainty starts a process that may eventually lead to
better developed schemas that may contain new and varied
information. People high in certainty should seek to
maintain their schemas, and thus ignore or avoid information
that is inconsistent with their schemas. According to Ruble
(1994)
,
uncertainty may arise when a person anticipates
entering a new situation (such as motherhood) , becomes aware
that perceptions and impressions are inconsistent, or
realizes that impressions are inconsistent. Thus,
uncertainty, in the form of awareness that old ways of
thinking are no longer adequate, instigates schema
development.
Certainty is relevant to another theory that accounts
for whether people seek consistent versus inconsistent
information. Higgins and Bargh (1987) have proposed that
subjects who are forming schemas remember more inconsistent
12
information, whereas subjects who are testing schemas
remember more consistent information, it seems likely that
level of certainty may often distinguish between these two
types of processing. Subjects who do not have confidently
held impressions may be striving to form an adequate
impression, whereas subjects with more confidence may be
testing to see if their impression is accurate.
It seems likely that certainty is sufficient to account
for differences in people's interest in information of
varying levels of consistency. However, certainty seems
insufficient to account for differences in people's ability
to process different kinds of information. It seems
possible to be quite certain about something and be unable
to remember relevant information because of a lack of
familiarity with the target. For example, the person who
enters a courtship situation convinced that "all women (or
men) are alike" is likely to miss relevant information.
Addressing this concern, the second important variable in
Ruble's model is level of knowledge. Logically, certainty
and level of knowledge should be related. Schemas that
subsume more knowledge should be less likely to be
reevaluated because the person is less likely to make
mistakes that lead to uncertainty.
According to Ruble (1994) , when uncertainty occurs, it
leads to greater interest in information gathering. This
new information is used in turn to form new and more
adequate impressions. With the new, better developed
13
schema, the uncertainty is reduced. Lack of certainty may
be caused when the individuals perceive that their
impressions are not accurate, for example when they realize
that they have made a mistake. Therefore, according to
Ruble's reasoning, certainty and level of knowledge should
be correlated.
Previous Research on Real Relationships
Most studies of impression formation and information
processing have used fictional targets. A notable exception
is a study by Park (1986), in which subjects described their
classmates in daily diaries over a 2 weeks period. Park
found that descriptions showed an increase in use of trait
descriptions as the subjects grew more acquainted with their
targets. In another diary study, Skowronski, Betz,
Thompson, and Shannon (1991) had subjects record events and
behaviors either of themselves or of someone else, as well
as rate how typical the events they recorded were for the
target. Thus, this rating of typicality measured what we
have been calling consistency. Subjects later tried to
recall their diary entries. Consistent with Hastie's (1981)
model, these researchers found a U-shaped function of
typicality on memory, such that very typical and very
atypical events were remembered better than somewhat
atypical events. Subjects in Skowronski, et al.'s (1991)
study reported on a target whom they knew well. This work
however, did not examine memory for less well-known others
and thus did not address whether individuals would show a
14
different pattern of recall for consistent versus
inconsistent information when they initially held strong
versus weak impressions of the target.
Present studies
The three studies reported here extend previous work by
examining whether memory biases found for fictional targets
generalize to memory for information about real people and
by examining how memory functions in the context of a
relationship with a well-known versus less well-known other.
Previous work relevant to schema development has addressed
such variables as amount of knowledge about a fictional
group (Stangor & Ruble, 1989b)
,
constancy of beliefs about
gender (Stangor & Ruble, 1989a) , or expertise in various
knowledge domains such as politics (e.g. Fiske, Kinder, &
Larter, 1983) and dating (Pryor & Merluzzi, 1985). In the
present studies, we defined the degree of schema development
as the extent to which individuals were acquainted with the
target person (i.e. whether they were strangers versus
friends)
.
Thus, this work examines how people remember
information about another person within the important
context of actual relationships. In all three studies, our
primary prediction was that individuals would remember more
impression-consistent information about friends, and more
impression-inconsistent information about strangers.
To test this hypothesis, subjects predicted the
responses of either a friend or a stranger to specific
situations and then read what they believed to be their
15
partner's actual response. The feedback (ostensibly from
the partner) varied in whether it was consistent, mildly
inconsistent, or very inconsistent with the subject's
prediction. Thus, our procedure was similar to Ruble and
Stangor's (1989b) procedure because we manipulated level of
consistency, and it was similar to Skowronski et al's (1991)
procedure because participants formed impressions of real
people.
In addition, we also used a variety of memory measures.
Two recent meta-analyses addressing memory and information
consistency (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan,
1992) found differences in types of memory measure. Rojahn
and Pettigrew (1992) found evidence that recall and
uncorrected recognition show a preference for inconsistent
information, whereas corrected recognition shows a
preference for schema consistent information, and the same
pattern was noted by Stangor and McMillan (1992). in
addition. Ruble and Stangor (1986) argued that uncorrected
recognition measures may be limited in measuring actual
memory effects, because they may be influenced by guessing
bias. Therefore, we examined schema development effects for
all 3 types of memory measures; uncorrected recognition in
Study 1, corrected recognition in Study 2, and free recall
in Study 3.
In each study, we also assessed whether differences in
encoding processes might account for the predicted
differences between friends versus strangers. Individuals
16
ir
s
ive
stated their thoughts while they were attending to the
partner's feedback, and judges later coded these thought
along several theoretically relevant dimensions (elaborat
comments, dispositional comments). A model proposed by
Hastie (1980) and extended by Srull (1981) predicts better
memory as a consecjuence of a greater number of associative
connections to the piece of information. Such a
relationship between elaboration and memory suggests that
memory bias differences between friends and strangers could
result from different patterns of elaborative commenting.
Specifically, friends may tend to elaborate impression
consistent information and therefore show a memory bias
favoring consistent information. In contrast, strangers may
tend to elaborate inconsistent information, and thus show a
memory bias favoring inconsistent information. Therefore we
predicted that friends would make more elaborative comments
than would strangers, and that elaborative commenting would
be associated with greater recognition.
We also explored whether memory for consistent versus
inconsistent information about friends would be linked to
other characteristics of the relationship (e.g. satisfaction
with the relationship) . Previous work (Murray & Holmes,
1993) suggests that people cognitively transform information
to maintain a positive view of a partner. Likewise, we
assume that remembering information that is consistent with
an impression of a friend helps individuals to maintain a
positive view of their friendship. Thus, friends who
17
remember more consistent feedback and less inconsistent
feedback should report greater satisfaction with their
friendship.
In Study 3, we also examined the role of certainty in
schema development. Stangor and Ruble (1989b) have noted
that certainty is likely to influence memory for
inconsistent versus consistent information. In addition, as
mentioned above, level of certainty seems a plausible
motivation for forming a schema versus testing a schema as
proposed by Higgins and Bargh (1987). Moreover, several
social psychological theorists (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, &
Eagly, 1989; Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991; Trope, 1983)
have hypothesized that certainty, or lack of it, predicts
information seeking. Information seeking might lead
individuals to attend especially to inconsistent
information, because it may be more informative. In
addition. Ruble's transition model (1994) suggests that lack
of certainty initiates a reevaluation process that may
eventually lead to the further development of the schemas by
adding new and varied information. Therefore, in Study 3 we
specifically examine the extent to which certainty accounts
for memory for consistent versus inconsistent information.
18
CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
Method
Overview
Study 1 addressed the influence of schema development
on memory for consistent versus inconsistent information
about strangers versus friends. We predicted that friends
would recognize a larger percentage of the consistent
feedback, whereas strangers would recognize a greater
percentage of inconsistent feedback.
Study 1 followed a 2 (Acquaintance: friend versus
stranger) x 3 (Feedback Consistency: consistent, mildly
inconsistent, very inconsistent) design. We presented
subjects with information that varied in its consistency
with their impressions of a partner. This partner was
either a friend or a stranger. Subjects first tried to
guess how their partner would answer a multiple choice
question. The feedback was presented as the partner's
actual answer. Later, subjects tried to recognize the
feedback.
Subjects
Thirty-nine undergraduate women and their same-sex
friends participated in exchange for experimental credit for
their classes or for a small gift (a box of cookies or a
small photo album) . Seven subjects (4 friends and 3
strangers) were at least mildly suspicious. Therefore, we
dropped 5 pairs (3 friend and 2 stranger) from the analyses
19
because one or both subjects were suspicious of the
feedback. We also dropped one pair because one of the
partners did not understand the instructions, and one pair
because of missing data. Therefore, the final analysis
included 32 pairs. Average acquaintance of subjects who
interacted with their friends was 16.9 months with a range
of 1 to 78 months, and of subjects who were separated and
interacted with strangers was 35 months with a range of 2 to
168 months.
Procedure
We required subjects to bring a friend to the
experiment, and scheduled two pairs of friends at the same
time. We randomly assigned half of the subjects (16 pairs)
to interact with a stranger from the other pair of friends.
The other half (16 pairs) were partners with their friends.
These two alternatives constituted the two main experimental
groups.
After being assigned a partner, each interaction pair
went to a separate room and had a brief conversation about
their day. After the conversation, we separated the
interaction partners. Subjects then rated their interaction
partners on 12 scales, taken from Norman (1963, see Appendix
A) , which measured the dimensions of extraversion,
conscientiousness, and agreeableness.
After completing the first questionnaire, subjects read
a series of multiple choice questions presented on the
computer screen. The questions asked what behavior would be
20
performed by the partner in a certain situation. For each
situation, subjects guessed how their partner responded.
For example, all subjects read the following question at
some time during the experiment:
Your partner wants to be an officer in her club. When theelection results come in they say that she only won theoffice she least wanted. What does she do?
1 !^ really bothers her but she gets over it
2 At first it bothers her a little but she gets over it.3 She IS glad to do the job.
4 It really bothers her and she doesn't get over it.
Subjects typed the number corresponding to their prediction
of their partners' response. The screen cleared briefly and
then the guess again appeared on the screen. For the above
example, if the subject typed "1" then the sentence "At
first it really bothers her but she gets over it." appeared
on the screen. The subject read the guess aloud and then
pressed return. This caused the computer to present the
(false) feedback about how the partner had actually
responded to the question. This feedback was supposedly
sent automatically via computer interface to the subject's
computer from their partner's computer, and appeared on the
screen beneath the guess. If the subject received
consistent feedback, a similarly worded answer appeared on
the screen.
If, from the above example, the subject guessed her
partner chose "1," and received consistent feedback, then
the following feedback appeared on the screen: "At first it
really bothers me but I get over it." If the same subject
were to receive mildly inconsistent feedback to the above
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question, then the following feedback appeared on the
screen: "At first it bothers me a little but I get over it."
If the same subject were to receive very inconsistent
feedback to the above question, then the following feedback
appeared on the screen: "I am glad to do the job." The
subject read the feedback aloud and then made a comment. We
recorded guess, feedback, and comment on a tape recorder.
The subject then pressed enter to proceed to the next
question. A complete list of the multiple choice questions
can be found in Appendix B.
We presented feedback at each level of consistency
(consistent, mildly inconsistent, and very inconsistent)
one-third of the time. We also counterbalanced the order
(and therefore the matching) of the consistency level with
each question and condition. We used a total of 28
questions (9 for each of the three levels of consistency,
plus one practice)
.
After guessing their partner's responses for all the
questions, subjects viewed the questions a second time and
tried to recognize their partner's responses. Following
this, subjects again rated their partners on the trait
rating scales, and answered several questions exploring the
subjects' friendship (see Appendix C) .
Debriefing . It is important to determine whether
subjects believed that the feedback was provided by their
partners. Subjects' level of suspicion was carefully
assessed during the debriefing session. Because of the
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importance of this issue, „e describe the debriefing session
in detail.
The debriefing procedure was completed by the
experimenter. Subjects who expressed suspicion at any time
during the debriefing, and their partners, were eliminated
from the experimental analysis. To start the debriefing
session, subjects again were asked if they had any questions
or comments. Subjects were then asked if they had ever
heard of experiments that employ deception. Specifically,
they were asked "Have you heard of the kind of experiment
where the experimenter tells you something is going to
happen, when actually something else is going on? An
example would be when the experimenter tells you that you
are talking on the phone to someone, and there is really no
one there, or when smoke suddenly comes out of the wall just
to see what you will do." Subjects were then informed that
this was that type of experiment, and asked if they had any
idea what deception had occurred. Subjects frequently said
that they thought that there was perhaps a hidden camera.
We then totally debriefed as to the hypotheses and
experimental manipulations used in the study. We stressed
that in fact none of the answers had come from their
partners, and that in fact the partner had been involved in
the same tasks as the subject, so that we never even asked
the partner how they would answer the questions themselves.
Dependent measures . First, after the initial task of
guessing the interaction partner's response, subjects
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completed a surprise recognition task in which they tried to
remember this (false) feedback. We predicted that friends
would recognize more consistent information than
inconsistent information, and that this effect would be
reversed for strangers.
Second, we tape recorded on-line comments. This
consisted of subjects reading aloud their guess, their
partners "real" response, and then making a comment before
continuing to the next question. These comments were
transcribed and coded into 43 separate categories. These
categories fell into sets, such as elaborative comments in
which the subject added new information (e.g., "Anybody
would respond that way,"), and other categories (e.g., no
comment, surprise) which are not relevant to the current
discussion.
Third, subjects rated their satisfaction and enjoyment
in their relationships with their friends. Relationships
between these variables and the memory measures will be
explored.
Results
Recognition
The dependent variable of central interest was the
measure of recognition (uncorrected for response bias)
.
Overall recognition proportion rate was high (.9322). We
performed a 2 (Acquaintance: friend versus stranger) x 3
(Feedback consistency: consistent, mildly inconsistent, very
inconsistent) repeated measures ANOVA, with subjects nested
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within partner-pair, nested within acquaintance. Main
effects of acquaintance and consistency were not
significant.
The interaction between acquaintance and feedback
consistency was significant, F(2,60) = 7.27, p < .002.
Figure 1 shows that subjects working with their friends
displayed higher recognition of consistent information
(.9626), moderate recognition of mildly inconsistent
information (.9211) and lowest recognition of very
inconsistent information (.9103), whereas subjects working
with strangers displayed lower recognition of consistent
information (.9083), and higher amounts of mildly
inconsistent information (.9519) and very inconsistent
information (.9391). Tukey planned contrasts showed that
the differences between all the means were statistically
significant at p < .05.
Coded Voice Protocols
Based on Srull (1981), we predicted that friends would
make more elaborative comments than would strangers, and
that elaborative commenting would be associated with greater
recognition. To test these predictions, we coded subjects'
comments by (a) whether they represented elaboration, and
(b) whether this elaboration was a dispositional
elaboration. We defined an elaborative comment as any
comment that introduced or referred to information not given
in the stimulus question, and dispositional commenting as
any comment that referred to a general trait or enduring
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Figure 1. In Study 1, friends tended to recognize
consistent feedback, whereas strangers tended to
recognize inconsistent feedback, F(2,60) = 7.27, p <
.002. All means significantly different at p <'.05.
quality of the partner. To assess the reliability of our
coding a second coder receded the protocols from 24 subjects
(37%, 1672 comments). Kappa reliabilities were acceptable
for elaborative commenting (.778) and for dispositional
commenting (.740). We correlated the number of comments in
these categories with recognition and acquaintance status
(friend or stranger)
. Contrary to our expectations, we
found no relationship between amount of elaborative comments
and either of these variables. Similarly, we found no
relationship between amount of elaborative commenting and
any recognition measure.
Based on Park (1986) , we predicted that friends would
make more dispositional comments (comments about traits or
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tendencies) of the target, and that more dispositional
comments would be associated with greater memory. Contrary
to our predictions, there was no significant relationship
between acquaintance status, number of dispositional
comments, and any recall measure.
Relationship Quality
Two items measured the quality of subjects'
relationships with their friends: "How satisfied are you
with your friendship?" and "How much do you enjoy being with
your friend?" We summed these items to create two
relationship quality measures. The first measure tapped
subjects' own perceptions of relationship quality. The
second measure tapped partners' perceptions of relationship
quality. These measures had a possible range of 2 to 14,
with lower scores indicating greater relationship quality.
Among friends, the actual range was 2 to 9, with a mean of
3.3. Among subjects whose partners were friends, higher
subjects' ratings of relationship quality were related to
increased recognition of mildly inconsistent feedback, r = -
.234, E = '031 (2-tailed) . The more positively subjects
viewed the relationship, the more they recognized mildly
inconsistent information. A similar, but non-significant
association was also found indicating that greater
relationship quality was correlated with greater recognition
of very inconsistent information, r = -.308, p = .118 (2-
tail) . The correlation between subjects' perception of
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relationship quality and recognition of consistent
information was close to 0.
Another way that the interpersonal relationship between
the subject and the partner may influence the subject's
memory may be the partner's rating of the relationship's
quality. The correlation between subject's and partner's
ratings were
.604, p < .05. To explore this area further,
we measured the correlation between the partner's rating of
relationship quality and subjects' memory. We found a
significant correlation between partner's rating of
relationship quality and memory for mildly inconsistent
feedback, r = -.330, p < .05, indicating that the greater
the partner rated the relationship enjoyment and
satisfaction, the better she recognized mildly inconsistent
feedback. Correlations between partner's rating of
relationship quality and recognition of consistent and very
inconsistent feedback were not significantly different
from 0.
Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 supported the hypothesis that friends would
show a memory bias favoring consistent feedback, whereas
strangers would show a memory bias favoring inconsistent
feedback. We found no main effect for level of consistency.
Therefore, unlike previous studies, we failed to find
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between recognition and
consistency. One explanation for this null finding may be
that the U-shaped pattern depends on irrelevant information
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in the "bottom" of the U. This interpretation is supported
by the fact that previous studies assumed that information
near the middle of a consistency continuum would necessarily
be irrelevant to the schema, m contrast we used
inconsistent feedback that was relevant to the schema.
An alternative hypothesis for the significant
interaction between acquaintance and consistency on recall
that it is due to positive guessing bias in friends, causing
a confound between the positivity of the feedback and the
consistency. Under this alternative hypothesis, the
interaction between acquaintance and consistency on
"recognition" performance would have nothing to do with
either information processing or memory.
This alternative hypothesis assumes that length of
acquaintance is confounded with the positivity of
expectancy. Therefore, because the expectancy would tend to
be positive in friends, their guesses would also be more
positive. Inconsistent feedback would tend therefore to be
negative. During the recognition task, the positive
guessing bias would again cause friends to guess positive
responses, leading to more errors on inconsistent, negative
feedback. This positive guessing bias would be absent in
strangers, causing an apparent difference between the
recognition rates of friends and strangers.
We looked for evidence of a positive bias in subjects'
initial trait ratings of each other. ANOVAs on trait
ratings (of agreeableness, conscientiousness, and
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extraversion) by acquaintance (friends versus strangers)
were not significant. it is possible, however, that the
multiple choice questions are more sensitive to a positivity
bias than are the trait measures. Therefore positive
guessing bias remains an alternative explanation for the
results in Study 1.
The second limitation of study l was that subjects
showed a very high recognition rate. This caused a
potential ceiling effect which limited the variability of
our dependent measure and thus our ability to detect
differences due to our independent variables.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Method
Overview
The purpose of Study 2 was to address the limitations
of a high recognition rates, and problems of differentiating
guessing bias from memory bias. As in Study l, we predicted
an interaction between schema development and information
consistency such that friends would remember more schema-
consistent information than schema-inconsistent information,
and that this pattern would be reversed in strangers.
Study 2 is identical to Study 1 with the following
three exceptions. First, the recognition task differed
between the two studies. One main advantage in Study 2 is
its use of a recognition procedure that controlled for
response bias.
We also hoped that the new procedure would increase
subjects' error rate by increasing the total number of
trials. In Study 1, during the recognition task, subjects
viewed the question and all four possible multiple choices
at the same time, and chose the one they thought they had
been given as feedback. The total number of possible errors
per subject in Study 1 was 27, one for each question. In
Study 2, subjects viewed the question and each of the four
possible multiple choices separately in random order, and
judged whether each particular choice had been chosen by
their partner. In this new recognition procedure, subjects
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could theoretically make 4 errors per question, one for each
multiple choice option. Therefore, in Study 2. the total
possible number of errors was 108.
In Study 2, to further explore the effect of degree of
acquaintance, we divided the friends into recent- versus
long-term-friends. Therefore, Study 2 used a 3
(Acquaintance: stranger, short term friend, long term
friend) x 3 (Feedback consistency: consistent, mildly
inconsistent, very inconsistent) design.
Subjects
Sixty-eight undergraduate women and their friends
participated in exchange for experimental credit for their
classes or for a small gift. A total of 14 subjects (8
subjects in the stranger condition, and 6 subjects in the
friend condition) were at least mildly suspicious, and were
excluded from analysis. Because all our analyses are
pairwise, we also eliminated the partners of these subjects
whether or not they were themselves suspicious. Therefore,
we eliminated 9 pairs (5 stranger pairs and 4 friend pairs)
because at least one subject in the pair was suspicious of
the feedback. We eliminated 2 more pairs (in the friend
condition) because at least one subject failed to complete
the experiment in the allotted time. Therefore, we included
57 pairs of subjects in the final analysis. Average
acquaintance for subjects categorized as long-term friends
was 63.1 months, with a range of 16 to 216 months; average
acquaintance for subjects categorized as short-term friends
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was
was 3.9 months, with a range of .5 months to 14 months; and
friends who were separated and interacted with strangers
8.3 months, with a range of .25 months to 120 months.
Procedurp-
As in Study 1 subjects brought a friend to the
experiment. We assigned one third of the subjects (19
pairs) to interact with a stranger from the other pair of
friends. We paired the remaining two thirds (38 pairs) with
their friends.
We separated each partner-pair into different rooms
where members of the pair had a brief conversation about
their day. Following this, we separated subjects into rooms
individually. Each subject then rated her partner on a
trait measure questionnaire. Following this, she viewed a
series of multiple choice questions on a computer screen and
tried to guess which answer her partner chose. After each
guess, the subject read feedback she believed to be her
partner's actual response. After receiving the feedback,
the subject then viewed each possible answer separately and
tried to identify whether this answer was the one given by
their partner. The subject then again rated her partner on
a trait measure questionnaire. As in Study 1, this second
questionnaire asked exploratory questions about the
subject's friendship.
Dependent Measures
The procedure used in Study 2 allowed for computation
of A' (Grier, 1971) , a statistic which corrects for
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guessing. m this procedure, subjects serially viewed one
of the multiple choices and pressed a key either marked
"yes" to indicate that this was their partner's response,
or "no" to indicate that this was not their partner's
response.
This method allows us to take into account both the
percentage of hits (correct "yes" responses) and the
percentage of "false alarms" (incorrect "yes" responses).
We used Grier's (1971) measure of recognition sensitivity
(A'), which ranges from .5 to 1, and uses the subject's
proportion of false alarms (x) and hits (y) . The
computational formula is as follows:
a'= c. ^y-^) U+y-x)
4y(l-x)
As in Study 1, we recorded subjects' on-line comments,
and measured relationship quality.
Results
Recognition
As in Study 1, overall recognition rates were high
(92.2% correct). Therefore the recognition procedure used
in Study 2 did not appreciably decrease recognition rates.
To test whether friends remembered more consistent than
inconsistent information and whether this effect was
reversed for strangers, we performed a 3 (Acquaintance:
stranger, short term friend, long term friend) x 3 (feedback
consistency: consistent, mildly inconsistent, very
inconsistent) repeated measures ANOVA, subjects nested
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within partner-pair, nested within acquaintance on the
recognition scores. Main effects for acquaintance and
consistency were not significant. The interaction between
acquaintance and feedback consistency was also not
significant.
To determine whether the predicted interaction held in
extreme groups, we conducted a 2 (Acquaintance: long-term-
friends versus strangers) x 2 (Feedback consistency:
consistent versus very inconsistent) repeated measures
ANOVA, subjects nested within partner-pair, nested within
acquaintance on A', m this analysis, the predicted
interaction between acquaintance and feedback consistency
was significant, F(l,36) = 4.25, p <.05. (See Figure 2.)
Consistent with our hypothesis, long-term friends recognized
more consistent (.9672) than very inconsistent information
(.9543), whereas strangers recognized less consistent
(.9509) than very inconsistent information (.9602). Tukey
planned contrasts showed that the differences within friends
in amount of consistent versus very inconsistent information
recognized was significant, p < .05. This difference in the
stranger group was marginally significant, .05 < p < .1.
Also, friends recognized significantly more consistent
information than did strangers, p < .05. The difference
between friends and strangers in the amount of very
inconsistent information recognized was marginally
significant, .05 < p < .1.
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Figure 2. In Study 2, friends tended to recognize moreconsistent feedback, whereas strangers tended to
recognize more very inconsistent feedback, F(l 36) =4.25, E <.05. Means with the same letter do not differ
significantly from each other.
Coded Voice Protocols
As in Study 1, we coded subjects comments by whether
they represented dispositional statements. Dispositional
comments are a subset of elaborative comments. A second
coder receded a subset of the data (32 subjects, 1938
comments)
.
Interrater reliabilities were acceptable for
both elaborative (Cohen's kappa = .764) and dispositional
(Cohen's kappa = .739) comments. ANOVA indicated no
significant difference between level of acquaintance (long-
term friends, short term friends, strangers) and amount of
dispositional or elaborative comments. In friends, we found
no evidence that length of acquaintance (in months) was
36
related to number of dispositional or elaborative
commenting, m fact, we found a surprising non significant
negative relationship between the number of dispositional
comments and length of acquaintance, r =
-.119.
We also analyzed the relationships between memory and
number of elaborative statements. We found a significant
correlation indicating that greater amount of elaborative
commenting was related to greater recognition of very
inconsistent information, r =
.208, e < .05.
Relationship Quality
As with Study l, we summed the items measuring
relationship enjoyment and relationship satisfaction to
create a measure of relationship quality. This measure had
a possible range of 2 to 14 with lower scores showing
greater relationship quality. Actual scores ranged from 2
to 12, with a mean of 4.1. We found a marginally
significant correlation suggesting that greater relationship
quality was related to greater recognition of mildly
inconsistent feedback, r = -.196, .05 < p < .1. Unlike
Study 1, we found no correlation between subject's and
partner's rating of relationship quality, r = .038. We
found a significant correlation indicating that the more
positively the partner rated relationship quality, the less
the subject recognized very inconsistent feedback, r = .311,
E < .05. No other correlations were significant. To
further explore the influences of acquaintance length and
relationship c[uality on memory, we performed separate
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analyses of long term and short term friends. The only
significant correlation was in short term friends,
indicating that greater partner's relationship quality
ratings were related to reduced recognition of very
inconsistent feedback, r =
.350, p < .05.
Discussion of study 2
Study 2 showed that long-term friends tended to
recognize consistent information about their partner,
whereas strangers tended to recognize very inconsistent
information. Although these results agree with those of
Study 1, they held only in analysis of extreme cells, namely
consistent versus very inconsistent information, in
strangers and long-term friends. Consistent with Study 1,
we found no main effect for consistency that indicated a U-
shaped pattern, or any other significant pattern.
Unlike Study 1, elaborative commenting in Study 2 was
positively correlated with recognition of very inconsistent
information. The fact that we had a larger sample in Study
2 than in Study 1 may have made Study 2 a better test of
this effect. As in Study 1, we found evidence that higher
relationship quality was related to greater memory for
mildly inconsistent feedback, though this relationship was
only marginally significant in Study 2. Correlations
between memory and partner's rating of relationship quality
were different between Studies 1 and 2. Specifically, Study
1 showed higher partner's rating being related to increased
memory for mildly inconsistent feedback, and Study 2 showing
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higher partner's rating being related to decreased memory
for very inconsistent feedback.
It is not clear whether the differences between Studies
1 and 2 are due to the use of different memory measures, to
random fluctuations, or to different lengths of acquaintance
in the two studies. Consistent with the latter
interpretation, average length of acquaintance of the
friends in Study 1 was about half (17 months) that of the
friends in Study 2 (33.5 months). Comparison is further
complicated by the fact that neither length of acquaintance
in long-term friends (63.1 months), nor in short term
friends (3.9 months) corresponded in length to the friend
group in Study 1.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Method
Overview
High recognition rates potentially limited statistical
power in Studies 1 and 2. Such high rates limit the
variability of the dependent variable and thus creates a
"ceiling effect." Therefore, in Study 3 we used a free
recall measure.
In Studies 1 and 2, we may have indirectly manipulated
both level of knowledge and certainty by assigning subjects
to be partners with either a friend or a stranger. Friends
knew more about their partners, and it is likely that they
felt more certain about their impressions. Strangers knew
less and probably felt less certain. In Study 3 we further
manipulated certainty with feedback about the accuracy of
subjects' trait ratings of their partner. Subjects were
assigned to one of three induced-certainty conditions.
Subjects in the "above average" and the "below average"
groups were informed that their trait ratings of their
partners were either above average or below average on
accuracy. Subjects in the control group were given no
accuracy feedback.
Although our certainty manipulation superficially
resembles our consistency manipulation, these manipulations
differ in the level of abstraction they address.
Specifically, the certainty manipulation only provided
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information about the general accuracy of the subjects'
impressions, whereas the consistency feedback allowed
subjects to focus on specific pieces of information. This
difference in level of abstraction seems to reflect our
experiences in everyday interpersonal interactions. For
example, we may focus in one instance on whether someone is
really friendly (or perhaps just manipulative) and at
another time focus on a specific behavior. Therefore, we
intended that subjects interpret the certainty manipulation
differently than the consistency feedback, and that this
difference would be psychologically valid.
As in Studies 1 and 2, we manipulated level of
knowledge by assigning people to work either with friends or
strangers.
Memory bias. Our prediction for the recall measure is
the same as in Studies 1 and 2. Friends will show a bias in
favor of remembering consistent information, and strangers
will show a bias in favor of inconsistent information.
However, whereas in previous studies our memory measure was
plagued by high recognition rates, we expected the number of
freely recalled items to be much lower, allowing for a more
normal distribution and more variance. These factors should
make the recall task a much stronger measure of the
consistency-acquaintance interaction
.
We hypothesized that certainty accounts for a
significant amount of the difference between friends and
strangers observed in Studies 1 and 2. We therefore
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predicted that strangers who are made more certain will
process information in a fashion similar to friends with no
certainty manipulation; they should attend more to
inconsistent than consistent feedback. Additionally, we
predicted that friends who are made less certain will
process information in a fashion similar to strangers with
no certainty manipulation; they should attend more to
consistent than consistent feedback.
In general, we expected increased certainty to enhance
the processing bias in favor of consistent over inconsistent
information, and we expected lessened certainty to enhance
the processing of inconsistent over consistent information
in all levels of acquaintance. Subjects in the control
condition would fall between the two certainty manipulated
groups in memory of each type of information, and similar to
the pattern found in Studies 1 and 2.
Subjects
Ninety-six undergraduate women and their friends
participated in exchange for experimental credit for their
classes or for a small gift. Twenty-five subjects were at
least mildly suspicious (7 friends and 18 strangers)
, and
therefore unusable. Therefore, we eliminated 21 pairs (13
stranger pairs and 8 friend pairs) because at least one
subject in the pair was suspicious of the feedback. We
eliminated 3 more pairs because of incomplete data.
Therefore, we included 72 pairs of subjects in the final
analysis. The average acquaintance for those subjects who
42
interacted with their friends was 34.3 months with a range
of 1 to 241 months, and of those subjects who were separated
from their friends and interacted with strangers was 31.2
months with a range of 1 to 262 months.
Design
Study 3 used a 3 (Feedback consistency: consistent,
mildly inconsistent, very inconsistent) x 2 (Acquaintance:
friend versus stranger) X 3 (Induced certainty: Accurate,
inaccurate, control) design.
Measures
Recan. study 3 included a free recall measure, taken
directly after the stimulus presentation. Subjects recalled
aloud as many of their partners' answers as they could, and
these utterances were tape recorded. Recalled statements
that combined different answers, or were otherwise difficult
to score were deleted from the analysis.
Measured certainty and positivity
. Subjects' pre- and
post-feedback certainty and positivity were measured, using
such questions as "How well do you think you know your
partner?" A list of these questions is provided in Appendix
D.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that used in Studies 1 and
2. Subjects were paired with either a friend or a stranger
and told that one of them will answer computer-presented
multiple-choice (juestions concerning how they would behave
in different situations. The other person in the pair would
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try to guess how her partner answered. The partners then
had a brief conversation about their day.
subjects were then separated and started answering
questions on the computer. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, subjects
made trait ratings on the computer (rather than on a
questionnaire)
.
These ratings were followed by pre-
manipulation questions exploring how positively subjects
evaluated their partners, and the subjects' certainty about
their impressions.
After subjects completed the ratings, we administered
the induced-certainty manipulation. Subjects in the "above
average" and "below average" conditions read feedback that
their ratings of their partner were compared to the
partner's self ratings. They were told that this comparison
indicated that their ratings of their partner was above (or
below) average in accuracy. Subjects in the control
condition read no induced-certainty feedback.
As is Studies 1 and 2, subjects then started the tape
recorder and commented aloud as they received feedback of
varying levels of consistency. As in the previous studies,
subjects made guesses about how their partner answered the
question, and read this aloud. Subjects then read aloud
feedback about how their partner had supposedly actually
answered the question. This feedback was controlled to be
either consistent, mildly inconsistent, or very inconsistent
with the subjects' guess, and constituted the manipulation
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Of impression consistency. Subjects then proceeded to the
memory task.
unlike Studies 1 and 2 which used only recognition
tasks, subjects in Study 3 proceeded to a surprise free
recall task. Subjects were informed that, for the next five
minutes, they should try to recall aloud as many of their
partner's answers as they could. Subjects' free recalls
(and other responses, which frequently included exclamations
of distress) were tape recorded.
Subjects then proceeded directly into the post-test
ratings, which include the trait and certainty ratings, in
addition, subjects were asked how many of their partners'
answers they had predicted correctly.
Debriefing. Initial debriefing questions were
presented on the computer, asking the subject to answer
aloud into the tape recorder. These questions probed for
suspicion by asking the subject to describe the purpose of
the study, and eliciting any questions or comments. In
addition, subjects were asked if they could suggest
improvements to the experiment, to make it less boring or
tiring. Many subjects suggested that we include multiple
questions about romantic relationships. Several subjects
wanted to know how many of the questions they had guessed
correctly, indicating that they believed that the answers
were coming from their partners. The debriefing was
completed by the experimenter, using the procedure outlined
in the previous studies.
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Results
Certainty Manipul ation ch^nV
immediately after reading the certainty manipulation,
subjects began the task of predicting their partners'
answers. After guessing their partner's answer to the first
question, but before getting the consistency feedback,
subjects rated (a) "How likely is it that you predicted
your partner's response correctly?" and (b) "What proportion
of your partner's future responses do you think you will
predict correctly?" The sum of these items constituted our
certainty manipulation check. We predicted that subjects
who had received feedback that their accuracy was below
average would show the least certainty, subjects who had
received no feedback would show a moderate amount of
certainty, and subjects who had received feedback that their
accuracy was above average would show the most certainty.
This measure ranged in possible scores from 2 to 14, with
higher scores indicating more certainty. The mean score for
all subjects was 9.21.
To test for the influence of the certainty
manipulation, we performed a 2 (Acquaintance: Friend or
Stranger) x 3 (Certainty Manipulation: High, Low, or
Control) ANOVA, with subjects nested within pair, and pair
nested within Acquaintance and Certainty Manipulation.
Results indicated no significant main effect or interaction
involving the Certainty Manipulation. Therefore, we have no
evidence that the certainty manipulation worked. We
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discovered a significant main effect for acquaintance, such
that friends were generally more certain on this measure
(10.39) than were strangers (8.04), F(l,66) = 42.75, £ <
.0001.
Measured Certainty and Positivity
We measured certainty of impressions of the partner and
positive evaluation of the partner at the beginning and end
of the experiment. The actual and possible range of
certainty scores was 6 to 42, with a higher score indicating
more certainty. We found significant differences between
friends and strangers on measured certainty, F(1,142) =
387.8, E < .001. Inspection of the means indicated that
friends expressed significantly more certainty about their
impressions (34.5) of their partners than did strangers
(17.1). To test for correlations between measured certainty
and positivity, we averaged over pairs. There were no
significant relationships between measured certainty and any
of the memory measures. We found no significant
relationship between positivity and any memory measures in
the total subject population. Among subjects in the friend
condition, we found a marginally significant correlation
between positivity and recall of consistent feedback, r =
.2970, E = .078.
Proportion Recalled
The overall mean proportion recalled was .34015. We
performed a 2 (Acquaintance: friend versus stranger) x 3
(Feedback consistency: consistent, mildly inconsistent, very
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inconsistent) x 3 (induced certainty: low, high, or control)
mixed model repeated measures ANOVA, using proportion
recalled as the dependent variable^. Subjects were nested
within partner-pair, and partner-pair in turn was nested
within level of acquaintance and level of induced certainty.
Level of consistency was the within subject factor, level of
acquaintance and induced certainty were between subject
factors.
Main effects: Main effects of acquaintance, and induced
certainty on recall were not significant (for both, F < l) .
The main effect for feedback consistency was significant,
F(2,66) = 4.671, £ < .0228. Inspection of the means
revealed a "U" shaped pattern, such that proportion recalled
of consistent feedback (.3378) and very inconsistent
feedback (.3676) were higher than for mildly inconsistent
feedback (.3151)
.
The predicted interaction between acquaintance and
feedback consistency on recall was significant, F(2,66) =
5.45, E < .01. As shown in Figure 3, friends recalled a
greater proportion of consistent feedback (.3759) than
either mildly consistent (.3017) or very inconsistent
Unlike the previous studies, the first (practice)
question was included in this memory measure. In previous
studies using a recognition measure, this question was
eliminated from the recognition trials. Justification of
the elimination of this question came from the fact that,
unlike other trials, this feedback was read in the presence
of the experimenter. In contrast, for the current study
this question was read in conditions identical to those of
the other questions. Therefore, justification for
eliminating it from the analysis are missing.
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Figure 3. In Study 3, friends tended to recall more
consistent feedback, whereas strangers tended to recall
more inconsistent feedback, F(2,66) = 5.45. p < .01.Means sharing the same letter are not significantly
different at p < .05.
(.3495) feedback, whereas strangers recalled a lower
proportion of consistent feedback (.2997), a moderate
proportion of mildly inconsistent feedback (.3284), and the
greatest proportion of very inconsistent feedback (.3856).
Tukey planned contrasts showed that all means were
significantly different, except the difference between
friends' recall of consistent feedback versus strangers'
recall of very inconsistent feedback, and friends' recall of
mildly inconsistent feedback versus strangers' recall of
consistent feedback.
To compare these data with those of Studies 1 and 2,
which had no certainty manipulation, we performed a separate
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analysis using only subjects in the control condition of the
certainty manipulation. The results were marginally
significant, F(2,44) = 2.65, g = .082. The pattern of means
was consistent with predictions. For subjects in the
control condition, friends recalled the greatest proportion
of consistent information (.4143), a moderate amount of
mildly inconsistent feedback (.3675), and the lowest
proportion of very inconsistent feedback (.3299). Strangers
in this group showed the opposite pattern, recalling the
lowest proportion of consistent feedback (.3079), a moderate
amount of mildly inconsistent feedback (.3310), and the
greatest proportion of very inconsistent feedback
(.3796)
.
Coded Voice Protocols
As in Studies 1 and 2, we coded subjects' comments by
whether they were elaborative or dispositional. A second
coder receded a subset of the responses (25 subjects, 1478
comments)
.
Interrater reliabilities were low for both
elaborative (Cohen's kappa = .590) and dispositional
(Cohen's kappa = .659) comments^. None of the correlations
between elaborative or dispositional commenting and recall
were significant.
* The main coder was the same for all three studies.
However, the reliability coder used in Study 3 was not the
same as the one used in Studies 1 and 2. This may explain
the difference in coding reliability between this study and
the two previous studies.
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Relationship Quality
As in Studies 1 and 2, we summed subjects' ratings of
relationship enjoyment and relationship satisfaction to form
a measure of relationship quality. Possible and actual
scores ranged from 2 to 14, with a mean of 5.2. Lower
scores indicated higher quality ratings. As in Study 2, we
found no significant correlation between subject's and
partner's rating of relationship quality, r = .085. We
performed correlational analysis of the percent recalled in
each feedback consistency and relationship quality (as
measured by relationship enjoyment and satisfaction)
. None
of the correlations between recall and subjects' or
partner's ratings of relationship quality were significant.
Discussion of study 3
The manipulation check in Study 3 failed to show that
we had manipulated subjects' certainty. Therefore, it is
not surprising that this manipulation failed to directly
influence subjects' memory bias.
Study 3 showed the predicted interaction between
acquaintance and consistency on recall, such that friends
tended to recall more consistent feedback and strangers
recalled more inconsistent feedback. This effect held for
the smaller subset of subjects who received no certainty
manipulation, although it was weaker. Unlike Studies 1 and
2, we found no relationships between commenting and memory,
or between relationship quality and memory.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Accfuaintance and Mf>mnrv Bias
The three studies presented here suggest that degree of
acquaintance is associated with memory for impression-
consistent and impression-inconsistent information about
actual partners. Friends showed a memory bias favoring
feedback that matched their expectations, and strangers
showed a memory bias favoring feedback that did not match
their expectations.
We demonstrated this effect in uncorrected recognition,
corrected recognition, and free recall. The presence of
this phenomenon in a wide range of memory measures suggests
that the effect does not depend entirely on properties
specific to any one of these memory tasks. Therefore, our
results contradict the conclusion reached both by Stangor
and McMillan (1992) and by Rojahn and Pettigrew (1992) that
recall and uncorrected recognition memory measures
demonstrate a bias favoring consistency whereas corrected
recognition demonstrates a bias favoring inconsistency.
Taken together, the current set of studies do not
provide strong evidence for a mediational role for
elaboration in memory bias. This effect may have been
relatively weak because we measured subjects' incidental
comments, which were probably spontaneous and relatively
effortless. Subjects in our study, especially those
commenting on their friends, may be practiced at making such
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comments. Further, they were encouraged to comment
spontaneously with whatever came to mind. Hence, these
comments may not have reflected effortful processing, and
therefore not enhanced memory, m contrast, subjects in
research demonstrating associative models (e.g., Srull,
Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985) may have been using more
effortful processing, which in turn leads to stronger
associations. This suggests that how mental associations
function may depend on the effort used in forming them.
With the exception of Study 2, we failed to find
evidence that subjects' or partners' ratings of relationship
quality influenced memory. This may have been due to our
use of a relatively weak measure, containing only 2 items.
Future studies could use a more validated measure of
relationship quality, such as the Dyadic Adjustment Scale
(Spanier, 1976)
.
Alternatively, the differences between the
results of the studies may have been due to differences in
average length of acquaintance between the three studies.
Only Study 3 showed evidence of the U-shaped function
of consistency on memory. It is unclear why this effect
would surface in this study and not the others. One
explanation may be that the U-shaped function is specific to
free recall. Consistent with this explanation is the fact
that all of the research Hastie (1981) cites as direct
evidence of the U-shaped function (Bower, Black, & Turner,
1979; Hastie & Kumar, 1979, Hastie & Mazur, 1978; Lingle &
Ostrom, 1979; Smith, 1973) used recall as the memory
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measure. Similarly, several more recent studies that
demonstrate the U-shaped function (e.g., Skowronski, Betz,
Thompson, & Shannon, 1991, Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart,
1985) used a free recall measure. Yet another viable
explanation is that the ceiling effects evidenced in our
recognition measures may have limited our ability to find
the U-shaped function.
ExDlanati nng
Like several other articles, this one started by
noticing that various studies show memory advantages for
either consistent or inconsistent information. One
difference between these explanations is whether they
propose that type of schema is an important factor in how
schemas influence memory. For example, Hastie (1981) does
not propose that the various results are due to different
types of schemas. Instead he proposed that these various
results actually reflected an underlying U-shaped function
of congruence on memory. The current set of studies do not
support this hypothesis. Only Study 3 provided evidence of
this U-shaped pattern, and this in addition to, rather than
instead of, the acquaintance-consistency interaction. The
fact that all the current studies found different memory
biases in friends versus strangers suggests that differences
in memory biases may reflect the influence of different
types of schemas. Of course this does not disprove Hastie 's
hypothesis because it is possible that both an underlying U-
shaped function and different types of schemas influence
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memory biases, what we have demonstrated is that memory
biases may depend on factors other than a U-shaped function.
In two of the three studies presented here, we found
evidence of a memory bias with no U-shaped function. This
suggests that differences in the type or quality of the
schema (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Ruble & Stangor, 1986;
Higgins & Bargh, 1987) may be an important factor in memory
biases.
Ruble and Stangor (1986) suggest that what appear to be
memory biases may technically reflect a response bias. For
the current set of studies, at first glance it seems
possible that friends may have both guessed and "remembered"
positive items, causing the appearance of greater accuracy
on consistent feedback. However, the fact that we found the
memory bias effect even on measures that corrected for
guessing bias suggests that the effect reflects a true
memory phenomenon. Further evidence against the positive
guessing bias explanation is that measured feelings of
positivity toward the partner were not significantly related
to memory in Study 3. These findings are consistent with
other research (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989;
Hastie, 1984) that also found no relationship between
positivity and memory.
A plausible explanation for our results may be that
friends' schemas interfered with their ability to process
inconsistent information. Therefore, it is possible that
subjects who had well developed schemas had to attend both
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to their impressions and to new information. This may have
caused confusion that inhibited information storage,
especially when the impression and the new information
disagreed. Another related explanation is that the well
developed schema friends possess, while in some ways
enhancing information processing, may itself constitute a
type of cognitive load. This cognitive load may have
inhibited these subjects' ability to process inconsistent
information. Consistent with this interpretation, Srull
(1981) found that loading subjects' cognitive capacity
reduced their recall of inconsistent information.
However, the previous explanation does not address why
those subjects who had weak impressions showed a bias
favoring inconsistent information. It seems that this would
require a separate mechanism. One such explanation is
provided by Higgins and Bargh (1987), who propose that these
subjects are seeking to form their impressions.
Inconsistent information may be more informative and thus
more valuable to these subjects, and thus they tend to
remember it better.
The interaction between acquaintance and impression-
consistency on memory may be relevant to relationship
stability. Relationship stability has been attributed to
self-fulfilling prophecy (Darley & Fazio, 1980) and self-
verification (Swann, 1987). Several researchers have argued
that beliefs remain stable in part because of poor memory
for impression-inconsistent information (e.g. Cantor &
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Mischel, 1977; Markus, 1977; Hamilton, 1979). To our
knowledge, relationship stability has not however been
attributed to information processing biases caused by schema
development. The development-consistency interaction
hypothesis predicts that relationship stability may be
enhanced by biased information processing, in other words,
for long-term relationships, expectancy inconsistent
information, which threatens relationship stability, is
remembered at a lower rate than expectancy consistent
information, which enhances relationship stability. Note
that our findings for relationship satisfaction do not rule
out a link between stability and memory biases, because
these two aspects of relationships do not always produce
parallel effects (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994). Thus,
it will be important for future work to examine whether
memory biases function to promote relationship stability.
Conclusion
The three studies have demonstrated that subjects with
weak schemas may show a memory bias favoring inconsistent
information, whereas subjects with strong schemas may show a
bias favoring consistent information. Although this effect
has been shown in literature reviews and meta-analyses, the
current studies present the strongest experimental evidence
for this effect. In addition, we have demonstrated that
this effect works in real interpersonal interactions and
relationships. We found no evidence that this effect is due
to response bias or to positivity bias in friends. Further,
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we found no evidence for a role for certainty in this
effect, we found evidence for a U-shaped function of
consistency on free recall, but only when certainty was
manipulated, and the change in memory biases between friends
and strangers seems independent of this phenomenon.
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APPENDIX A
TRAIT RATING SCALES FROM NORMAN (1963)(First scale is filler.)
Please place an "X" on the line to indicate where yourfriend falls between the two end points.
For example,
Fashion-conscious
| L_JLJ I I I I | Not Fashion-
Conscious
An "X" like the one above indicates that you think your
friend is closer to the description on the left (Fashion-
Conscious) than to the one on the right (Not Fashion-
Conscious) .
Please turn the page and start part 1.
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^^^^^^^^1
'
^ \ \ \ \ L__I_ impractical
Talkative
\ \ \ I I I I I silent
Good-natured I
\
!
I I I I I irritable
Compulsively fussy I I I I I | | | carel
Frank, Open I I I I I I I I Secretive
Jealous I I I I I I I I Unjealous
Undependable I I I I I I I I Responsible
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Adventurous
I I | I i i i i 4. •
' ! ! ! ' I I Cautious
Headstrong I I I I
I I I I Mild,
Gentle
Unscrupulous I
\ I I I I I I scrupul
Reclusive I I I I I I | | sociable
Cooperative I I I I I I I I Negativ-
istic
Persevering I I I I I I I I Quitting,
Fickle
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APPENDIX B
STIMULUS QUESTIONS USED IN STUDIES 1-3.
Practice Question.
Your partner has a job at the zoo and she notices a childteasing a caged bear. How does she respond?
^
no? K^''?^''^^5J
explains to the child that animals shouldt be teased.
2 She firmly tells the child not to tease the bear.
3 She yells at the child until it stops teasing the bear.
4 She ignores it.
(1) She wants to be an officer in her club, but when the
election results come in, they say that she only won the
office that she least wanted. What does she do?
1 At first it really bothers her, but she gets over it.
2 At first it bothers her a little, but she gets over it.
3 She is glad to do the job.
4 It really bothers her and she doesn't get over it.
(2) She is planning a long car trip. There has been a
funny noise coming from the car lately, but it seems to run
fine. How much maintenance does she do on the car before
she leaves?
1 She has a mechanic try to fix the noise even if it is
expensive, and also has a quick check over done.
2 She has a mechanic try to fix the noise as long as its
not too expensive, and also has a quick check over
done.
3 She has a mechanic try to fix the noise as long as its
not too expensive, but has no maintenance done beside
that.
4 She has a mechanic try to fix the noise even if it is
expensive, and also has the car totally checked over.
(3) After leaving a store, she realizes that the cashier
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gave her too much change. What does she do?
^
money!''^''
^^^"^ considers returning with the extra
2 She immediately returns the money to the cashier.
^
around^to^i?^"''^
returning the money, but never gets
4 She thinks about keeping the money, but then returns
(4) She wants to tell you about her day, but you tell heryou have homework to do. How does she respond?
1 She still ends up telling you a lot about her day.
2 She is very quiet and lets you study.
3 She still tells you a little about her day.
4 She sets up a time so you can get together later.
(5) She is traveling alone, taking her first cross-country
train trip. She soon discovers that if you want to meet
anyone, you have to hang out in the lounge car. What does
she do?
1 She spends a little time in the lounge car, but mostly
stays at her seat.
2 She spends as much time as possible in the lounge car,
and meets several new people.
3 She divides her time fairly evenly between the lounge
car and her seat.
4 She spends most of her time in the lounge car and makes
some friends, but occasionally excuses herself to go
back to her seat.
(6) Her friends are helping her move into a new apartment.
While they are unpacking, she notices that the contents of
the kitchen drawers in the old apartment are all mixed
together among several boxes. What does she do?
1 She takes the time right then to sort out all the
kitchen stuff so that it is in drawers just like in the
old apartment.
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2 She doesn't really care which drawer thinas are inShe 3ust puts things away randomly when she gets ??.
^
afte?"nno^!;w^^ "'^^^ =he had them before, andr u packing, goes through and puts it all ik order.
' forglts^t!'^"^^
^"""^ """^^ ^''^ ""^^ "^f""' then
Hoi does she reac??"*^ "'"'^ ^'^'^ ^^""^^ " "P-t.
1 She tells lots of people.
'
w^th^^ri^^ds^"'"" ^^^^ -^-^ —Pt
^
no^ H^^-r^^f^""? ^^^^P^ ^it^ ^^^^ friends, but ist hesitant to talk about it with anyone.
4 She tells a couple friends about the fight, but asksthem not to tell anyone.
(8) She goes out with friends for pizza. How much does sheparticipate m the conversation?
1 She talks far more than anyone else.
2 She hardly says a word the whole evening.
3 She says a little more than everyone else.
4 She says a little less than everyone else.
(9) She signs up for a seminar class in a Japanese economic
theory. The class has nine other students, and they sit in
a circle and discuss the issues. Soon into the class, she
realizes that not only does she not like the subject matter,
but she doesn't like the other students much either. What
does she do?
1 She doesn't let on that she doesn't like the students
or the subject.
2 She makes it clear that she doesn't like some of the
other students.
3 She says some things that make the other students
wonder if she doesn't like them.
64
cllL'''L^'^ls°lL^lll^^ "^^^ '""^ ''^^'^"^ - the
1 She tells lots of people.
' tfL?l^no?onef^'^^'^'
3 She is not hesitant to talk about it with anyone but
frXnds.^°
^""^ °^ ""^^
^° ^^"^ exCeprher
4 She is not hesitant to talk about it with anyone, butdoesn't go out of her way to tell anyone.
(11) She has worked at the same job on campus job for 2years. How many arguments has she had with her co-workers?
1 She hasn't had any arguments.
2 She has had more than her share of arguments.
3 She has had a few arguments.
4 She has had a moderate number of arguments.
(12) When using a vending machine, she discovers that
whenever she presses "coin return" a dollar in quarters
comes out. There is a service phone number on the machine.
What does she do?
She immediately calls the service number and doesn't
take any money.
She fills her pockets with as much money as the machine
will give her, and then leaves without calling the
service number.
3 She takes a couple handfuls of money, and then calls
the service number.
4 She takes a moderate amount of money, and then leaves
without calling the service number.
(16) She finds out that her romantic partner is going to be
in a wedding party and that her romantic partner's old
girlfriend will also be in the wedding party. How does your
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friend feel?
1
2
3
tL^i'^fo ^^ti^ ^ l^^^^^ ^P^^^' then decides thathere is nothing to worry about.
She is very upset and can't stop thinking about it.
out of it^^^^^^
worried, but doesn't make a big deal
She is unhappy about it, but decides to let it go for
now. ^
^^^L^*^?
always sees the same people from one of her classeson the bus to school. What does she do?
1 After a while, she says hello when she sees them, and
eventually engages some of them in conversation, but
never becomes friends with any of them.
2 After a while, she says hello when she sees them, but
never engages any of them in conversation or becomes
friends,
3 She never acknowledges that she recognizes them.
4 She becomes friendly with several of the people she
sees every day.
(18) She works at a bank. Another employee is blamed for her
error involving thousands of dollars. It cannot be traced.
What does she do?
1 She thinks about it for a while, but never confesses.
2 She immediately confesses that the error is hers.
3 She thinks about it for a few days, and then confesses.
4 She thinks about it for a few hours, and then
confesses.
(19) She is really attracted to Chris, her best friend's
romantic partner. Her best friend really loves Chris, but
they are having troubles in their relationship. Her friend
asks for help in getting them together again. How does she
respond?
1 She does her best to help patch things up between her
friend and Chris.
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1 She oversleeps a little and ends up making theappointment just on time. ^K n
'
appo^ntmeit?^' ^"'^ "^^'^^ ^ ^'^^^^ ^^^^ the
^
entirlly!^^^^^
^"^^ ^""^^ missing the appointment
4 She gets up in plenty of time to make it to the
appointment on time.
(21) She volunteers for a job in a club, she finds that theDob requires much more time than she expected. What does
she do?
1 She completes the responsibilities of the job, at the
expense of her social life.
2 She tries for a few davs to complete some of the
responsibilities of the job, and then informs the club
that she will not be able to complete all of the
responsibilities
.
3 She tries for quite a while to complete some of the
responsibilities of the job, and then informs the club
that she will not be able to complete all of the
responsibilities
4 She tries for a few weeks to complete some of the
responsibilities of the job, and then informs the club
that she will not be able to complete all of the
responsibilities
(22) On a camping trip everything seems to go wrong. How
does she respond?
1 She remains annoyed about how badly the trip is going.
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34
?east?^
troubles on the trip bother her in the
??%?:etim^s!^
"''^"^ troubles, but manages to enjoy
gene^alTjiiV^::^ JlS^S/^"^^""'"^
oncl before!""^^ ^^^^
''^^^ attractive person she met
She tries to join into a conversation with Pat. If sheis unsuccessful, she keeps trying.
She tries to join into a conversation with Pat. If sheIS unsuccessful, she gives up.
She tries to figure out if Pat recognizes her or not
and only approaches if Pat shows some sign of
recognition.
She simply reintroduces herself to Pat.
(24)
During an airplane trip she promises to send an interesting
magazine article to her seatmate. What does she do?
1 Sending the article crosses her mind, but she never
does anything about it.
2 She sends the article at the first possible
opportunity.
3 She seriously plans to send the article, but never
actually gets around to it.
4 She eventually sends the article.
(25) Her apartment mate has a romantic partner that visits
from out of town about once every six weeks. The apartment
is really too small for them to have any privacy when she is
there. What does she do when the romantic partner is in
town?
1 She stays out of the apartment as much as possible.
2 She doesn't change her daily activities at all, and she
resents this person dropping in.
3 She makes some effort to stay out of the apartment so
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that they can have some privacy.
* doesn'^min/^h"^^ her daily activities at all, but shen t md the romantic partner coming for visits.
(26) She is getting ready for a date when she discovers that
?s tSer^^^^^•^ borrowed her favorite dress. Her rooLatfIS here, talking on the phone. What does she do?
' asL"lor\hfdresfbacr^"^ °" ^""^ ^"^ ^'^^
2 She briefly interrupts the roommate's phone
conversation and asks about the dress.
3 She interrupts her roommate's phone conversation anddemands that she return the dress immediately.
4 She changes her plans and wears another dress.
(27) She goes on a bicycle trip across Europe. The weatheris much worse than expected, and most of the travelers aregrumpy. How does she act?
1 She lets the weather get her down, but not as much as
some of the other travelers.
2 She manages to maintain a somewhat positive outlook.
3 She remains the cheeriest one of the group.
4 She is one of the grumpiest in the group.
(28) After hoping for wee to get a promotion in her job, she
discovers that her friend Barb got it. How does she feel?
1 She just resents that Barb got the promotion.
2 She is simply happy for Barb.
3 She tries to feel glad for Barb, but mostly she just
resents the fact that she didn't get the promotion.
4 She is a little upset that she missed the promotion,
but mostly happy for Barb.
(29) She stays home so that she can have some peace while
studying for an exam in 1 hour. Outside, some children
start to play so loudly that it is nearly impossible to
study. She has no time to find another place to study.
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What does she do?
1 She yells at the children until the are quiet.
' chuiren are'n^isy!^ "° ^^^^^ ^«
^
^iet!^^
children several times if necessary to be
4 She asks the children one time to be quiet. If thev
k ?! ^^^^ ^^i^s t^e^ best to studyeven though the children are noisy.
(30) She borrows your new portable cassette player to takeon a picnic. During the picnic, the cassette player issuperficially damaged so that its appearance is ruined, butIt still works fine. What does she do?
1 She offers to buy you a new one, but if you tell her
she doesn't have to, she is relieved that she doesn'thave to buy it.
2 She explains how the cassette player was damaged and
apologizes, but makes no offer to buy you a new one.
3 She never even tells you what happened to the cassette
player.
4 She insists on buying a new one, even though you tell
her she doesn't have to.
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APPENDIX C
RELATIONSHIP MEASURES USED IN STUDIES 1-3.
friendshTrif^-i^l^K ^ questions about the yourhip with the person with whom you arrived.
1) How long have you known your friend?
years, months
tSgethe?^^
°^ activities do you and your friend do
3) How much time do you and your friend spend together onany given day, on the average? (Circle one.)
1) less than an hour
2) 1-2 hours
3) 3-4 hours
4) 4-5 hours
5) more than 5 hours
4) How close are you and your friend? (Circle one.)
1) She is my closest friend.
2) She is a close friend but I have other,
friends closer than her.
3) She is a friend but not an especially a
close one.
4) She is just an acquaintance.
5) Have you and your friend ever lived in the same dorm
room, apartment, or house? (Check one.)
yes. How long? months, years.
no
6) How satisfied are you with your friendship? (place a
check on the line.)
very very
satisfied unsatisfied
7) How much do you enjoy being with your friend?
very very
much little
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APPENDIX D
CERTAINTY AND POSITIVITY MEASURES USED IN STUDY 3.
iLi^^^^^^'^^y^ COULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR PARTNER'
q
PERSONALITY TO SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T KNOW HER?
^
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VeryAt Al 1 v j.
Well
^LIS®^^^^"^^^ WOULD OTHER PEOPLE WHO KNOW HERAGREE WITH YOUR DESCRIPTION OF YOUR PARTNER?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not yVery Much Much
3) (Positivity) HOW MUCH DO YOU LIKE YOUR PARTNER?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dislike Like
Very Much Very Much
4) (Positivity) GENERALLY HOW POSITIVELY WOULD YOU RATE YOUR
PARTNER?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Very
Negative Positive
5) (Certainty) HOW WELL DO YOU THINK YOU KNOW YOUR PARTNER?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Very
At All Well
6) (Certainty) HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DEPEND ON
YOUR PARTNER TO DO WHAT YOU EXPECT HER TO DO?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Very
Very Much Much
7) (Certainty) HOW WELL DO YOU UNDERSTAND YOUR PARTNER?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Very
At All Well
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8) (Certainty) if YOU WERE IN A NEW SITUATION WITH vhttoPARTNER HOW WELL WOULD YOU KNOW HOW TO ACT S'JtH SeR?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VeryAt AT 1 vtii
Well
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